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This Special Issue of the Network Industries Quarterly focuses on Brazil. The goal is to 
provide readers with an overview of the main achievements and current challenges faced 
by public utilities’ regulation in the country. 
Brazil is the seventh largest economy in the world in terms of GDP. As a consequence 
of the privatization program launched in the 1990s, a significant portion of public services 
was transferred to private investors under long-term concession agreements. This was the 
case of transmission and distribution of electricity, roads, railroads and telecommunica-
tions. However, despite privatization, the State remains an important player in sectors 
such as electricity and oil & gas, which increases the complexity of regulation considering 
an environment in which State-owned companies interact with private investors.
This volume of Network Industries Quarterly consists of five papers that shall provide 
readers with a broad sense of what happened in terms of public utilities’ investment in 
Brazil in the last two decades and some trends for the future. 
The first paper, written by the editors of this volume, presents the 1990s’ reform 
that led to a privatization program and the concession of public utilities’ services to pri-
vate investors. We argue that, although such program succeeded in attracting more than 
USD 73 billion in investments between 1995 and 2002, the country is currently facing 
huge obstacles, such as the deterioration of the macroeconomic scenario; increase of legal 
uncertainty, political and regulatory risks; as well as lack of proper financing mechanisms 
and transparency.
During the 1990s Brazil also experienced the creation of regulatory independent 
commissions to regulate public utilities’ sectors. The paper from Azumendi shows the 
results of a research in which he analyzed the characteristics of the members of the Board 
of Directors of such commissions at the federal level, in terms of their origin (whether 
from public or private sector), academic training (level of formal education), and process 
of appointment (whether they were subject to scrutiny by the National Congress or not). 
Azumendi concludes that while the Boards of Directors show acceptable levels of acade-
mic training and a balanced composition of members with different backgrounds, there is 
still room for improvement; mainly, the practice of appointing interim directors that are 
not scrutinized by the Senate and without mandate, should be abolished.
The three last papers are dedicated to the assessment of specific public utilities’ sectors.
Ashley Brown provides us with a discussion as to whether the natural gas industry 
in Brazil should be liberalized adopting a simpler licensing mechanism. He claims that 
Brazil would have relied too much on the concession regime to foster investments in 
exploration, production and transportation through pipelines. In such a context, the 
country could benefit from a licensing regime more suitable to entry and competition. 
Additional hurdles to the industry development include vertical integration, a defective 
open access regime, insufficient market monitoring, and physical bottlenecks, such as the 
lack of storage facilities.
The paper by Castelar and Azevedo discusses pros and cons of unbundling infras-
tructure management and service provision in the rail system. The article comments on 
the decision to implement vertically-integrated rail concessions under the State reform of 
the mid-1990s, and on the 2012 frustrated tentative to unbundle the system under the 
Logistics Investment Program I. The paper argues that the recent decision to step back 
from such a very complex sectoral reform was generally a positive measure.
Finally, the paper from Canêdo-Pinheiro discusses the development of telecommuni-
cations’ regulation in Brazil since the privatization program of the 1990s, emphasizing its 
positive results in terms of introducing competition, especially through mobile services. 
On the other hand, the paper argues that the telecom sector suffers from huge tax burden.
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Introduction
The adequate provision of infrastructure is critical to 
ensure the effective functioning of an economy1. The 
World Economic Forum measures the competitiveness of 
a country through a set of pillars, among which infras-
tructure is a basic one. Even though at the policy level 
there is an explicit commitment to improve the extent and 
the quality of infrastructure provision in Brazil, the recent 
trends in the country are not positive2. In such a context, 
it is worth investigating the main bottlenecks to unlock 
the required investments in network industries in Brazil. 
The era of concessions and its challenges
Similarly to several other countries, in Brazil until the 
1990s vertically integrated monopolies controlled by the 
State were the main providers of infrastructure such as te-
lecommunications, oil and gas, electricity, railways, ports 
and roads. 
Following a liberalization trend previously experienced 
by some economies such as the UK, and Latin American 
countries such as Argentina and Chile, Brazil underwent 
a reform that included a privatization program. The 
Brazilian privatization program attracted more than USD 
73 billion between 1995 and 2002 and allowed a signifi-
cant expansion of access while improving the quality of 
service provision in several utilities. 
In order to create the legal background for such pro-
gram, in February 1995 the National Congress passed law 
8,987/95 (the general public services’ concession law), 
which recently celebrated its 20th anniversary. It repre-
sents the inaugural landmark to rule the contractual rela-
tionship among the State and its partners – a public or 
private infrastructure provider – in the rendering of public 
services3.  
Concessions and Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
are to date still the main drivers for investments in public 
utilities in Brazil. For the sake of illustration, in 2015 the 
government launched new Programs to foster investments, 
aiming at attracting R$ 200 billion for transportation 
infrastructure and R$186 billion for electricity between 
2015 e 2018. The success of such investment programs, 
however, relies on several factors that are yet to be handled. 
Among the main obstacles one can cite political and regu-
latory risk as well as lack of proper financing mechanisms 
and transparency. 
From the economic perspective, concessions are a 
combination of efforts between public and private par-
ties. Often the providers are able to meet the provision´s 
revenue requirements through user charges – amounting 
to the full and standard concession. Under some circums-
tances, however, the concern with high prices or tariffs 
that could lead to exclusion of users motivates the choice 
for a strict PPP4.  
The effectiveness of public-private partnerships to 
promote investments in infrastructure depends on seve-
ral items. Firstly, the public partner/Administration must 
either develop the projects directly or, in case of third par-
ties, assess the results properly. The success of the conces-
sion is critically dependent on the quality of the projects 
Twenty years of infrastructure concessions in Brazil
Joísa Dutra*, Patrícia Sampaio**, Edson Gonçalves***
* Joisa Dutra is a professor at the FGV Graduate School of Economics in Rio de Janeiro and Director of the Center for Regulation and Infrastructure 
(CERI/FGV) (joisa.dutra@fgv.br) 
** Patricia Sampaio is a professor at the Law School of FGV in Rio de Janeiro, researcher at the Center for Law and Economics/FGV Law School, and 
associate researcher at CERI/FGV (patricia.pinheiro@fgv.br)
*** Edson Gonçalves is a professor at the FGV Graduate School of Economics in Rio de Janeiro and researcher at CERI/FGV (edson.goncalves@fgv.br)
1 The effects of infrastructure on economic development are adequately addressed by the field of Economic Growth. For more details (not exhaustive) see 
Calderon & Serven (2004).
2 In the most recent assessment, Brazil’s rank has downgraded from 57th to 75th position. In the infrastructure pillar Brazil ranks 74th out of 140 
countries. World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2015-2016.
3 This delegation process went on with the approval of Law 9,478/97, which rules on concessions regarding E&P in the oil and gas industry, and Law 
11,079/04, which governs Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), among other statutes.
4 In the Brazilian legal framework, “sponsored PPPs” are arrangements in which the concessionaries´ revenues are complemented by government transfers to 
allow cost recovery.
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and studies in the preparation of the bid. In Brazil, the 
awarding of concessions to build and operate infrastruc-
ture facilities usually takes place when the projects and 
viability studies are not sufficiently developed yet, adding 
to uncertainty and risks. 
Despite the privatization process, the State remains to 
be an important player in infrastructure through its State-
owned companies. This poses additional challenges to the 
institutional design and the regulation of public utilities, 
such as how to mitigate political interference. Corporate 
governance of State-owned companies has proved to be a 
sensitive matter, especially in light of minority sharehol-
ders’ rights. 
Financing infrastructure investments. 
The country has been facing huge challenges lately. Private 
investments in infrastructure have been declining signi-
ficantly in the latest years. As a consequence, Brazil is 
lagging behind other BRIC countries. Considering both 
private and public origins, investments in infrastructure 
range from 2% to 2.5% of the GDP, an amount consi-
dered insufficient to restore the existing stock of assets. 
Tables 1 and 2 report data on the evolution of aggregate 
and infrastructure investment in Brazil.
The stimuli from governmental programs such as the 
Logistics Investment Programs I (2012) and II (2015) have 
not been able to overcome this scenario. Fiscal constraints, 
budgetary imbalance and high regulatory risk are causing 
postponements in the launching of new concessions. 
The National Development Bank (BNDES) has been 
the most important financier of infrastructure in the 
country in the last decades. The institution is the major 
source of long-term financing, providing funds referenced 
in the Long Term Interest Rate (TJLP)5. This rate is com-
paratively lower than regular rates from commercial banks 
The bank’s disbursements in infrastructure increased 
significantly since 2003, going from USD 938 million6 to 
USD 11.2 billion7  in 2014. However, several reasons such 
as the recent economic downturn coupled with corrup-
tion scandals involving major construction companies8 led 
to a decrease in BNDES’ financial operations. As a result, 
in 2015 the conditions to long-term funds became more 
stringent for both existing and new concession contracts 
(Table 3)9. 
The closing of the infrastructure gap depends not only 
on promoting investments but also on the strength of 
regulatory institutions, the reduction of legal uncertainty 
and more emphasis in market mechanisms.
It would also be useful to look for recent developments 
in regulation of network industries in mature economies, 
which are facing the need to adapt to major trends such 
as digitalization, decentralization and climate policies. In 
particular, it would be useful to reassess the role of mar-
kets in these industries. For the sake of illustration, there 
seems to be no emphasis in market mechanisms to allocate 
dossier
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5 Long Term Interest Rate (TJLP) depends on historical inflation, expected inflation and country risk premium. The methodology is updated every year by 
BNDES. For details see (in Portuguese): http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/export/sites/default/bndes_pt/Galerias/Arquivos/produtos/download/tjlp.pdf
6 It is equivalent to R$ 2,71 billion (Brazilian currency). It was considered the exchange rate at 12/31/2003 (R$2,8884/USD) as released by Ipeadata.
7 It is equivalent to R$ 29,9 billion (Brazilian currency). It was considered the exchange rate at 12/31/2014 (R$2,6556/USD) as released by Ipeadata.
8 “Lava Jato” is the federal police and Attorney-General task force operation designed to investigate frauds involving Petrobras and other State-owned com-
panies. Several major Brazilian construction firms are being prosecuted as well as officers and politicians.
9 In order to illustrate the dimension of these disbursements in USD, it might be considered the annual average exchange rate (R$/USD) released by the 
Central Bank of Brazil: 1.7412 in 2009, 1.6662 in 2010, 1.8758 in 2007, 2.0435 in 2012 and 2.3426 in 2013. However, it is important to keep in mind 
that since the disbursements are made in Reais, the calculation of the respective values in US Dollar does not reflect the original trajectory of disbursements 
throughout the years. 4
Table 1 – Infrastructure Investments in Brazil (% GDP)
Source: Velloso 2015
Table 2 – Infrastructure Investments in Brazil by sector 
(% GDP)
Source: Frischtak and Davies (2014)
Table 3– BNDES Disbursements in Infrastructure (R$ billion)
Source: BNDES annual report (2013)
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demand response, ancillary services and energy efficiency 
in the electricity industry. In addition, the use of economic 
instruments to allocate water rights among its multiple 
uses (such as navigation, electric energy production and 
irrigation) is still lagging behind (OECD, 2015)10. Stimuli 
should also be granted to the development of a natural 
gas market, considering the increasing participation of this 
resource in the electricity mix. 
The urgent need to foster investments in logistics
Among its main challenges, Brazil urgently needs to close 
its logistics gap in order to become more competitive in 
the global context. According to the Logistics Performance 
Index, in 2014 Brazil ranked 65 among 160 economies 
assessed, having fallen from the 45th position in 2012. 
Roads are the dominant mode, amounting to almost 60% 
of the transports. Since 1994, 61 concessions representing 
almost 12,000 miles of roads were awarded to promote 
investments, aiming at an adequate provision of trans-
portation services at both the federal (21) and state (38) 
levels11. It is worth noting that the quality in the private 
provision of road services is consistently assessed as better 
than the public roads12.
The initial roads concessions allowed investments at 
moderate tolls. However, the investments requirements in 
the new concessions are more stringent. Consequently, in 
future awards the government will have to choose between 
allowing higher returns (and tolls) or complementing the 
concessionaries’ revenues (through PPPs). Even though 
the PPP Law was enacted in 2004, no concession at the 
federal level has adopted such mechanism so far13.  
The railway system, on its turn, is quite poor in term 
of density and also when volume of cargo is compared to 
the road system14. Private investors entered into the sector 
in the 1990s by means of vertically-integrated long-term 
concession agreements executed after bidding processes. 
Although the concessionaires were quite successful in 
reducing accidents and improving freight movement in 
the existing railroads, the system experienced almost no 
expansion.
Hence, the government tried to reform the sector to 
induce investments mainly through additional conces-
sions and unbundling of the industry. The 2012 Logistics 
Investment Program (PIL I) proposed a reform that would 
mandate unbundling of infrastructure management and 
service provision. In order to lower freight costs and re-
duce demand risk to the new railroads, the new framework 
would rely on a scheme that would shift risks from the 
concessionaries to the government. A State-owned com-
pany (Valec) would buy the full rail transport capacity in 
advance and resell it to independent freight operators. 
Such proposal is perceived as plagued by government 
failure. Even though the 2015 version of the Federal pro-
gram (PIL II) did not bring any explicit regulatory reform, 
and the 2012 proposal was neither implemented nor for-
mally abandoned, it seems that the government is shifting 
back to a vertically-integrated model. 
Conclusion and challenges for the future
Since the mid-1990s, concession agreements have been 
playing a central role in public utility industries in Brazil. 
Lately, however, infrastructure sectors have been facing 
huge challenges in attracting new investments. Among 
the main obstacles one can cite political and regulatory 
risk as well as lack of proper financing mechanisms and 
transparency. Concession contracts should provide for a 
proper risk allocation, endowing the government with 
mechanisms to handle unforeseen or uncontracted events 
inherent to long-run relationships. It is also important to 
create an environment favorable to attract capital, assuring 
a viable financing structure. Besides, soft bottlenecks are 
important impoundments to the success of infrastructure 
concessions, adding to the perception of regulatory risk. 
Included in this category are the business environment 
and proper corporate governance of utilities, especially for 
State-owned companies. 
The reversal of this critical scenario requires private ca-
pital markets to complement BNDES funds; opening the 
market to foreign operators and construction companies; 
emphasizing market mechanisms; amending the auction 
design and the concession contracts to properly allocate 
risks between public and private partners; and improve-
ments in the regulatory agencies’ decision-making process. 
These issues are essential to enhance the role of concessions 
as instruments to foster investments delivering better and 
more reliable infrastructure, inducing the country’s com-
petitiveness and growth. 
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10 OECD (2015), Water Resources Governance in Brazil, OECD Studies on Water, OECD Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264238121-
en.
11 ABCR (2014). Statistics data 2014. http://www.abcr.org.br/SetoremNumeros/SetorNumeros.ashx?codigo=3&texto=http%3a%2f%2fwww.abcr.org.br%
2fConteudo%2fSecao%2f43%2festatisticas.aspx
12 CNT (2015). Pesquisa CNT de Rodovias 2015, Relatório Gerencial, Brasilia. http://pesquisarodoviascms.cnt.org.br/Relatorio%20Geral/PESQUISA_
CNT2015_BAIXA.pdf
13 Brandão and Saraiva (2008) model the BR-163 road concession as a PPP using a real options approach. Contrary to the favorable results of the adoption 
of the mechanism, the government awarded the concession allocating part of the investments to DNIT, a public company. Due to financial distress, the 
government initiated a renegotiation process to shift the responsibility of the investments back to the concessionary.
14 According to the National Logistics and Transportation Plan, in 2011 the rail system accounted for only 25% of the total cargo transported, whereas 
roads accounted for more than 50%. Ministry of Transportation. National Logistics and Transportation Plan (PNLT), 2012.
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Context
Decision-making in independent regulators has been a 
recurrent area of concern in the infrastructure sector. It 
is often argued that a professionalized Board of Directors 
would insulate politics and allow the adoption of rational 
regulatory policies. Furthermore, this would be benefi-
cial for all actors including consumers, providers and the 
government. The case for the full professionalization of 
Boards has been held normatively but also supported by 
empirical evidence.
The literature has emphasized the positive impact 
of professionalized Boards of Directors, over politically 
oriented ones, on decision-making. In a study of Boards 
of Directors of State-Owned Enterprises of Italian munici-
palities, Menozzi et al (2011) find that politized Boards of 
Directors have a positive and significant effect on employ-
ment but this is not reflected in differences in performance. 
In an extensive review of Board effectiveness, Vagliasindi 
(2008) referred to relevant literature pointing out a si-
gnificant correlation, especially in developing countries, 
between Board composition and company’s financial per-
formance. Finally, Lopez Azumendi et al (2011) found a 
positive correlation between the governance of state-ow-
ned enterprises, particularly its Board of Directors, and 
firms’ sector performance.
The composition and role of Boards in regulatory 
agencies of Brazil has been understudied, especially using 
historical data series. This paper presents the first com-
prehensive assessment of Boards of Directors of Brazilian 
regulatory agencies. Through unique datasets, the paper 
describes the composition of Boards for nine (9) regula-
tory agencies, providing policy recommendations for im-
provement. Findings contribute positively to the literature 
on regulatory governance and public sector management.
 Methodology
This paper addresses the configuration and functioning 
of Boards of Directors in regulatory agencies of Brazil. 
The assessment is based on different measurements of 
Boards’ governance: composition, academic levels, and 
procedures of appointment. The assessment is based on a 
unique dataset, built within the Center for Regulation of 
Infrastructure (CERI), using historical data series. Boards 
of regulatory agencies were analyzed since the establish-
ment of each agency until the year 2015.
Assessment
Origin of Directors
This measurement takes into consideration the job of the 
Director before his/her appointment. It is an important 
“proxy” of both competence and independence. It mea-
sures the relevance of the job and the relationship of the 
Board member with politics and the regulated sector.
Results show a homogenous representation of different 
regulatory actors. The majority (22%) of Directors come 
from high-level positions within the agency, which gua-
rantees Board members with knowledge of the sector and 
a professional reputation he/she would like to maintain. 
The telecommunications’ regulator has the majority of 
(57%) of Directors coming from the agency’s bureaucracy. 
The second most relevant group of Directors comes 
from companies. Directors from the private sector repre-
sent, since the establishment of agencies in the country, 
around twelve percent (12%) of all appointments. 
Regulators of the transport and oil sectors have approxi-
mately thirty percent (30%) of their members from the 
private sector. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have lower 
levels of representation on agencies’ Boards than the pri-
vate sector. 
Political representatives such as Secretaries of State 
and Ministers are not as relevant as Directors from the 
agencies’ bureaucracy and the private sector. Regulators of 
the airport (15%), water (7%), and oil sectors (17%) have 
Boards of infrastructure regulators: the case of Brazilian 
federal regulatory agency
Sebastian Azumendi*
* Sebastian Azumendi is a Researcher at the Center for Regulation and Infrastructure of the Fundação Getulio Vargas (CERI/FGV) (sebastian.caliri@fgv.br). 
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the highest levels of political representation. Secretaries of 
State are preferred to Ministers as Directors of regulators.
Academic training
A second measurement of Board’s governance is the acade-
mic background of those appointed as Directors. It could 
be assumed that a Director with a good academic forma-
tion would be not only knowledgeable about the sector 
but also interested in progressing in his career or insulating 
his/her professional name from bad regulatory decisions. 
Law 9.986/2000 requires members of the Boards of regu-
latory agencies to have a university degree.
Results from the dataset show that only a few percen-
tage of Directors, since agencies were established, held a 
postgraduate degree before appointment. Out of four 
hundred and thirty-two (432) Directors (total number 
of Directors appointed since the establishment of agen-
cies in Brazil), only eighteen percent (18%) held a PhD 
or a Master’s degree before appointment. Agencies opera-
ting in technologically driven sectors tend to have Board 
members with better skills than those agencies operating 
in sectors with less technological demands.
Procedures of appointment
The President with the agreement of the Senate appoints 
Board members of regulatory agencies in Brazil. According 
to Law 9.986/2000, members of the Board need to com-
ply with the following criteria: have a Brazilian nationality, 
a university a degree, lack of a criminal record, and be well 
regarded in the field of the agency’s mandate. 
Even though most of the Directors have been appoin-
ted following legal requirements, there is a recent trend 
of appointing acting Directors. The President of the 
country, ad-hoc the Senate’s confirmation, appoints acting 
Directors. According to the dataset, regulators of the te-
lecommunications and transport sectors have the largest 
numbers of acting Directors among all regulatory agencies 
of Brazil. This situation poses a threat to the principle of 
autonomy of decision-making as in many cases the man-
date of acting Directors is extended over time, not comp-
lying with Law 9.986/2000. 
Data from Congress shows that the Senate has rejected 
a limited number of Directors. The approval by the Senate 
of candidates proposed by the Executive has been, since 
the beginning of regulatory agencies, almost complete. 
Moreover, data from Congress also shows that most of 
candidates to high-level positions that need Senate appro-
val have received his agreement. 
Conclusion
Independent and professionalized Boards of Directors 
were introduced in regulatory agencies of Brazil as a way 
to insulate politics from regulatory-making. It has been a 
process that, with ups and downs, has been maintained 
and improved over time. This has differentiated Brazil 
from other Latin American countries, such as Argentina, 
that once fostered better infrastructure regulation through 
independent commissions.
The analysis of Boards of nine (9) regulatory agencies 
of Brazil over their lifetime shows positive results as well 
as space for improvement. On the one hand, Boards of 
Directors show acceptable levels of academic training and 
a balanced composition of members with different back-
grounds, the majority coming from high-level positions 
within the agency. On the other hand, the practice of ap-
dossier
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pointing acting Directors, avoiding the agreement of the 
Senate and requirements established in Law 9.986/2000, 
should be banned as it poses significant threats to the prin-
ciple of autonomous decision-making.
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Bureaucratic Bottlenecks
The bureaucratic origins of the problem stem from two 
sources, the licensing system, and the heavy reliance on 
central planning. First, in regard to central planning, the 
problem is that it places all initiative in the hands of the 
state. It is the state that must carry out geological studies 
to identify potential areas for drilling, deciding whether 
or not to grant concessions for the rights to drill, and, 
if so, then define boundaries for the granting of conces-
sions. In addition, for adding infrastructure such as na-
tural gas pipelines, it is the state, through its planning 
process which predefines where investment should go. 
Private entities, which might be willing to put its capital 
to work building out infrastructure, are not allowed to do 
so without having to obtain a concession which is largely 
defined through a central planning system. While such a 
system might be understood if treasury funds were put 
at risk, it lacks any real rationale where the capital being 
used is purely private. While the theory underlying the 
policy is that pipelines are a responsibility of the state, 
which the government can either perform or enable a pri-
vate concessionaire to carry out, it must be cognized that 
that theory can also be served by a liberalized system that 
reduces or eliminates archaic bureaucratic barriers to put-
ting infrastructure in place to serve the nation. 
The licensing problem is that the system, largely de-
rived from medieval French law and Portuguese colonial 
practice, discourages individual exploration. Interestingly, 
in regard to mining, Brazil has repudiated that tradition. 
While in natural gas, any party who conducts explora-
tory activities for the resource, has no assurance that he 
will reap the benefits of his work, because any discovery 
reported to the state will then have to be put out to com-
petitive bidding that others may very well win. That is 
dramatic contrast to what occurs in mining, where a par-
ty exploring for minerals can obtain a license to carry out 
his search, and, if he is successful in finding minerals, he 
is very likely to be the one who benefits from the work he 
did. In short, the incentive for private investors to search 
for natural gas does not exist. Why bother to explore if 
you are not all that likely to be the beneficiary of your own 
efforts?
While it is true that the resources below the surface 
belong to the state in Brazil, that fact does not compel 
such a top down approach that strongly discourages pri-
vate risk taking in searching for natural gas. The state’s in-
terest is not in a perverse set of incentives that only makes 
the discovery of gas less likely, but, rather, is in gaining 
its fair share of the value of the resource, and in assuring 
that extraction is carried out in a way that least disturbs 
the environment and public safety. Those objectives can 
easily be achieved by a combination of taxes and sensible 
regulation, but do not require that all initiative is left to a 
bureaucratic process that confounds meaningful and pro-
ductive economic signals. 
Economic Bottlenecks
The economic arrangements within which the pipelines 
operate include a series of barriers to optimize the sector. 
These barriers include the following:
Vertical Integration
The natural gas industry has a variety of components, 
but its midstream consists of two basic elements, the com-
modity business and the transport (pipeline) business. 
The first component, like any other commodity market, 
is, absent artificial constraints, a competitive activity. The 
transport function, absent appropriate structural or alter-
native transport arrangements to preclude it, is a classic 
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monopoly function. Indeed, the pipeline is the only means 
available to transport natural gas to the marketplace. Thus, 
it is obvious that if a participant in the commodity market, 
controls the monopoly facility providing market access to 
all players in the commodity business, the entity control-
ling that access will use that position to its competitive 
advantage and keep competitors from accessing the mar-
ketplace. That is precisely the situation in Brazil’s natural 
gas industry. Petrobras, the dominant player in the com-
modity business, with very little, if any, constraint, also 
controls the transport system that all commodity players 
need to move their product to market. For a major world 
economy, such a constraint is a severe handicap, unless it 
is mitigated through either structural separation (i.e. no 
company in the pipeline transport business can be in the 
commodity business and vice versa), or through legal/
regulatory measures that mitigate the monopoly power of 
the vertically integrated entity. While structural separation 
or disaggregation of transport and commodity functions 
is self-explanatory as a resolution of the problem, the pro-
blems associated with vertical integration, even without 
structural separation, can also be mitigated by the fol-
lowing measures, ones which are not currently in place in 
Brazil.
Open Access
The most obvious way to mitigate monopoly power in 
the natural gas transport business is to mandate open ac-
cess, and, of course, to vigorously enforce that mandate. 
In Brazil, under present law, there is effectively, no open 
access for alternative suppliers of natural gas. While the 
revisions in the natural gas law a few years ago called for 
open access after a period of time, it is, at best a tepid 
step, and, at least, for a period of time, leaves vertical inte-
gration intact. In the absence of open access, a regime in 
which any party seeking to sell natural gas, has the ability 
to reach its customers, it is hardly surprising that there are 
precious few entrants into the market, not only to buy, 
sell, or trade natural gas, but also to engage in seeking na-
tural gas because of uncertainty of market access. Indeed, 
“uncertainty,” is an understatement, given the fact that the 
pipelines are controlled by a competing supplier of gas. 
The problem of closed access is, of course, compounded by 
the fact, noted earlier, that the concession process makes 
it extraordinarily difficult for an investor to build its own 
pipelines to bypass the bottleneck controlled by a compe-
titor. Stated simply, open access is the sine qua non of a 
fully functional and robust natural gas market. Without 
transparent and open access, the Brazilian natural gas mar-
ket will remain out of sync with modern notions of the 
business, sync sill lack a fully functional market. 
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A critical component of open access is the existence of an 
independent market monitor. The function of the monitor 
is to monitor and make transparent to all, the actual real 
time use if the pipeline. By having a monitor, the pipe-
line owner/ operator will not be relied upon to indicate 
whether or not capacity is available for other users to ac-
cess. This is a particularly valuable function where, as in 
the case of Brazil, the owner/operator is also a vendor of 
natural gas, and, therefore, has an economic incentive to 
deny access to a competitor. If the pipeline were entirely 
outside of the control of a buyer or seller of natural gas, 
the market monitor’s role might be a less important one, 
but in the context of the Brazilian situation, it is essen-
tial. It is very poor public policy to rely on representations 
regarding the availability of access from a party that has 
a powerful economic motivation to deny availability. The 
monitor would also be invaluable for the regulator should 
it be asked to mandate access for a party to whom it was 
denied. It would allow the regulator to know, in real time, 
what capacity is or ought to be available.
Capacity Market
It is important to note that the lack of multiple pipelines 
does not mean that competition cannot exist in providing 
pipeline capacity. The right to buy, sell, and use pipeline 
capacity is completely severable from ownership and/or 
operation of the facility. Indeed, it is common practice in 
many pipeline systems to sell, or even lease the right to use 
a designated amount of a pipeline’s capacity. By making 
those rights fully fungible, a high degree of liquidity in 
injected into the capacity market and monopoly power is 
significantly reduced. It also offers potential investors in 
new pipelines as an opportunity to spread the investment 
risk. The fact is that secondary capacity markets are quite 
common in pipeline systems, and Brazil would be well ser-
ved by enabling their evolution.
Physical Bottlenecks
Pipelines are not the only physical bottlenecks on the sys-
tem. The absence of storage facilities is also a major han-
dicap. Storage would enable buyers and sellers to manage 
pipeline constraints, avail themselves of price fluctuations 
in the market, and manage seasonal fluctuations that may 
be found in the movement of natural gas into and around 
Brazil. It would be useful to facilitate the process for licen-
sing storage facilities and approving tariff arrangements for 
them.
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Introduction
The current decade is shaping up as a new lost decade for 
the Brazilian economy. According to estimates from the 
Brazilian Institute of Economics (Ibre/FGV), by 2020 per 
capita GDP will probably be back to the level first reached 
in 2010. Although ill-devised macroeconomic policies 
are largely to blame for this outcome, poor infrastructure 
has also contributed to keep output growth down. This 
is particularly true regarding transportation. Thus, accor-
ding to the 2015-2016 Global Competitiveness Report 
(World Economic Forum, 2015), among 140 countries 
for which these indicators are available, Brazil ranks 121 
in roads, 120 in ports, 95 in airports and 98 in railroads 
regarding the quality of infrastructure.
It is not hard to pinpoint the factors leading to the 
poor condition of Brazil’s rail sector. Through the second 
half of the 20th century, as in much of the rest of the 
world, Brazilian railroads lost market share and became 
financially unsustainable. In particular, state-ownership 
caused policy (and political) objectives to influence ma-
nagerial decisions and led to tariffs that failed to reflect 
costs and rose below inflation. 
Brazil’s rail freight sector was privatized in the mid-
1990s1. A new regulatory framework for the sector, toge-
ther with the concession contracts, established the rules 
the new private operators had to follow. In addition, in 
2001 the government created a regulatory agency, the 
National Agency of Terrestrial Transport (ANTT, in 
Portuguese), to oversee the sector and enforce the conces-
sion contracts. Concessionaires committed to meeting 
specific output and security goals, but were otherwise 
subject to only light regulation, being free to decide how 
to reach their goals. This framework worked rather well, 
with the goals being largely surpassed: in the following 15 
years (1997-2012), the accident rate fell 83% and rail out-
put, measured in ton-kilometer, grew at an annual average 
of 5.3% (Pinheiro 2014).
The first reform of the Brazilian rail sector
Although sector performance has generally improved, 
various problems persist. Average train speed remains 
low and investment in rail infrastructure, particularly in 
greenfield projects, has not expanded. In the beginning 
of the 2010’s, the government concluded that there was 
insufficient competition among rail operators and that 
this explained the low investment in network expan-
sion. In response, in 2011 ANTT enacted new regula-
tions that significantly altered the regulatory framework 
of the Brazilian rail sector. The new rules sought to foster 
competition and investment by separating the operation 
infrastructure (tracks and stations) from that of transport 
services per se.
While reforming regulation, the government also 
launched, in 2012, the Logistics Investment Program 
(PIL, in Portuguese), a list of infrastructure projects to 
be granted as concessions to private investors. These new 
concessions would operate under complete vertical separa-
tion, with Valec – a state-owned enterprise – playing the 
role of a surrogate market for slots in the rail infrastruc-
ture. To that end, an open access regime would be set up 
and Valec would intermediate interactions between infras-
tructure concessionaires and transport operators. In parti-
cular, Valec would buy all transport capacity from the for-
mer, therefore eliminating demand risk. This was deemed 
necessary to encourage greenfield projects. Afterwards, 
Valec would resell the right to use rail tracks to transport 
operators. This mechanism would channel subsidies to 
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investors, since the government did not expect Valec to be 
able to resell all the available capacity. The infrastructure 
operators would also be able to borrow from BNDES, the 
Brazilian Development Bank, at highly subsidized interest 
rates.
For existing concessions, not susceptible to separation, 
the idea was to enforce new, more stringent rules concer-
ning access rights, which basically foresaw unbundling the 
operations of infrastructure and transportation. The regu-
latory model in force since the privatization already esta-
blished right of way rules, but the legal regulations of 2011 
created instruments that facilitated their implementation.
The reform of railway regulation in Europe, which has 
been under way for the last two decades, was the source of 
inspiration for the 2011 reforms in Brazil. It is remarkable, 
however, that the Brazilian authorities tried to emulate the 
new European regulatory framework, considering that 
vertical separation in Europe has had ambiguous effects, 
or worse, and that Brazil´s institutional setup is so dif-
ferent2. Indeed, what the European experience has actually 
taught us is that, to work well, vertical separation in the 
rail sector requires a complex, well-functioning institutio-
nal framework (Finger 2014). Without a regulatory body 
fully equipped and capable of processing, producing and 
conveying the relevant information to stakeholders – ser-
ving as the official/main disseminator of the sector´s tech-
nical and legal facts –, as well as of coordinating decisions 
across firms, vertical separation will do little good to the 
efficiency of railways.
In fact, just the opposite may happen: establishing an 
open access regime with separation of infrastructure and 
transportation services raises operational and transaction 
costs, generating other sources of inefficiency. The main 
reason for that is that vertical separation requires different 
firms to coordinate their decisions in a context of asym-
metric information, conflicting goals, and low entry bar-
riers in the transport services segment. Economic theory 
teaches us that, in this context, moral hazard – for ins-
tance, it is very hard for a third party to determine, ex-
post, each firm´s responsibility in an accident, making it 
attractive to sub invest in maintenance – and adverse selec-
tion will become more prevalent.
Other unwanted outcomes that may emerge from 
vertical separation of railways are cream skimming (in-
dependent transport providers, who do not own tracks, 
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may only be interested in the most lucrative segments and 
products, leaving the rest unserved) and the excessive use 
of rail infrastructure, in a “tragedy-of-commons” situa-
tion. Furthermore, the increase in transaction costs make 
contracts less complete and more prone to judicial dis-
putes, further pressuring administrative and operational 
costs – already up due to the loss of economies of scope3. 
Lastly, if the regulator tries to avoid such contractual pro-
blems through micro-regulation, it will likely increase 
firms´ administrative costs, in addition to reducing their 
flexibility to operate.
It is not surprising, therefore, that most countries have 
adopted a vertically integrated model in the rail freight 
sector. Among the existing systems, American railways are 
the most successful: since the enactment of the Staggers 
Act, which greatly deregulated the sector, while preserving 
its institutional setup, railroads in the United States have 
significantly increased their productivity and lowered acci-
dent rates. At the same time, they have become financially 
sound (Association of American Railroads 2015).
Thus, the 2011 reform of railway regulation not only 
overlooked the evidence from Europe, but also contrasted 
with the general stance regarding the sector’s structure 
worldwide. And this in a country with weak regulatory 
institutions4. Moreover, the new framework was a radical 
departure from the existing model, generally perceived as 
successful although in need of some improvement. The 
new model also lacked a solid legal basis5, making an alrea-
dy unstable business environment even more uncertain. 
Finally, a key flaw in the new model was its dependence 
on Valec´s ability to honor payments for the infrastructure 
capacity it was supposed to buy: this would depend on it 
receiving annual transfers from the Treasury, over decades, 
which unsurprisingly made investors jittery.
The second reform of the Brazilian rail sector and the 
challenges ahead
It was a bad idea to adopt such dramatic regulatory 
changes while also trying to attract investors to bid at new 
greenfield projects. Not by chance, thus, none of the rai-
lway projects listed in the PIL attracted private interest. 
In June 2015, the government announced the new stage 
of the Logistics Investment Program (PIL 2). It expects 
capital outlays of approximately US$ 46 billion, of which 
US$ 20 billion (over 40%) in railroads. In this new stage, 
the government plans to return to the vertically integrated 
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concession model adopted during the privatization of the 
sector.
We see this as a positive change. Yet, we are not op-
timistic that this stage will be any more successful than 
the preceding one for a number of reasons. First, more 
than US$ 9 billion, or a fifth of total funds, correspond to 
the Brazilian part of the Bioceanic Railway, a continental 
railroad that is projected to cross South America through 
Brazil and Peru, linking the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. 
The Chinese government has shown great interest in this 
new trade route, and committed to prepare the project and 
possibly implement it, but at this stage it seems inappro-
priate to consider investments in a project that complex 
– involving environmental and diplomatic issues, among 
others – as likely to happen within the PIL 2’s timeframe. 
Indeed, no one has yet done a study to check whether the 
Bioceanic Railway is economically viable.
Second, the other railway undertakings included in the 
PIL 2 are a recast of the projects that were part of the origi-
nal PIL, comprising the construction of four thousand km 
of tracks, as well as investments of US$ 3.7 billion in exis-
ting concessions. It is unclear why investors will be more 
interested in them than before, considering the much less 
favorable current economic environment.
Third, regulatory uncertainty remains high. With a 
rising fiscal deficit6, the government decided to back away 
from the regulatory reform initiated in 2011, but failed 
to state what it planned to do instead7. Yet, from what 
the Brazilian government has (or not) declared since it 
launched the PIL 2, it is reasonable to assume that it has 
abandoned the idea of separating infrastructure and trans-
port operations or implementing an open access regime in 
the rail freight sector. It is clear, thus, that new concessions 
will take place according to a vertically integrated model 
and that Valec’s role in the sector will be again limited to 
procuring civil works. However, the authorities continue 
to advocate in favor of unbundling infrastructure from 
transportation services and of track sharing as a means to 
foster competition.
Fourth, the government’s track record on project struc-
turing in infrastructure is quite poor. Thus, a feature of the 
rail undertakings listed in the PIL 2 that deserves atten-
tion is the government’s plan to outsource project prepa-
ration to private firms, through a mechanism known as 
“expression of interest procedure” (PMI, in Portuguese), 
which resembles the unsolicited proposal scheme also seen 
in other countries8. Unsolicited proposals have become 
quite common in emerging countries, but, in Brazil, the 
recourse to PMIs in infrastructure projects has not shown 
great results. Indeed, few PMI studies have actually led 
to project implementation. Additionally, the evidence 
suggests that such procedure limits competition in pro-
curement, although there are ways to mitigate that risk by 
changing the rules.
The Brazilian government proposed a financial model 
for railway projects under the PIL 2 very similar to that in 
the original program: that is, plenty of subsidized BNDES 
loans. The government expects easy credit to compensate 
for high regulatory risk and to allow for low transport 
tariffs. In other words, not only users, but also taxpayers 
will bear a large part of the cost of railway investment. 
Nevertheless, investors have seriously questioned the ac-
tual availability of those resources, given the current fiscal 
crisis.
Conclusion
In sum, the Brazilian government seems to have given 
up on vertical separation and open access in the rail sector. 
In principle, this is broadly a good thing. However, regu-
latory uncertainty remains high, especially because the 
government has conducted this process with insufficient 
transparency and clarity about its goals. Moreover, impor-
tant issues such as the low speed of trains and the difficulty 
to develop greenfield projects have not been addressed.
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Introduction
Much of gap between Brazil and the more developed 
countries is due to problems with its infrastructure. The 
positive impact of investment and adequate provision of 
infrastructure services on the levels and rates of growth 
of per capita income, as well as the indicators of inequa-
lity, is well known and documented. Specifically, there 
is solid evidence in relation to telecommunications and 
the Internet: mobile telephone service (GRUBER & 
KOUTROUMPIS, 2011), including broadband mobile 
(THOMPSON JR & GARBACZ, 2011).
The positive impacts are manifested through dif-
ferent channels: from increased productivity in compa-
nies, including increased household income (mainly for 
the self-employed) and the welfare of consumers, to the 
economic effect of the investments needed to sustain the 
provision of these services. Furthermore, since they repre-
sent network infrastructure, that is, because the benefits 
increase when a larger number of users are connected, 
these gains tend to be seen only after a certain level of the 
dissemination of the services is reached.
Unlike other types of infrastructure, telecommunica-
tions is not a mature sector. Technology has evolved at an 
astounding rate, a fact that continues to create difficulties 
for attempts at regulation. Or deregulation, to the extent 
that some segments are potentially competitive. 
It should be noted that with regard to infrastructure 
in general and transportation (roads, railways, ports and 
airports) indicators, Brazil’s performance is below average 
for middle-income countries and similar (and sometimes 
lower) than that of poor countries. On the other hand, 
Brazil’s lack of infrastructure appears to be relatively less 
with respect to communications, since Brazil displays a 
higher than average performance than the middle-income 
countries. In the specific case of mobile telephone service, 
Brazil is fairly close to the average for the rich countries. 
In Brazil, telecommunications is probably the sector 
in which the liberalizing reforms of the 1990s were the 
most complete and most successful. The mobile telephone 
service segment is emblematic: all the relevant companies 
are private, competition was established, access to services 
has increased significantly and investment remained high. 
The process of introduction of mobile services in Brazil 
started in the late 1980s. In 1988, a precedent was set for 
the private operation of such service without, however, 
preventing the state-run telecom carriers from doing so. 
In 1997, ANATEL’s jurisdiction was established for pu-
blishing the regulations for this service.  With the breakup 
of the Telebras System, the country was divided into ten 
areas, with two frequency bands for each area assigned, 
called band A and band B. Band A was reserved for the 
former Telebras System companies and band B was spe-
cified for the new carriers. After the tender for band B 
bandwidth usage, whose contracts were signed between 
June 1997 and April 1998, the privatization process of the 
former Telebrás System carriers (band A) was initiated.
With the start of the auctions of new frequency bands, 
and the mergers and acquisitions between the companies, 
the mobile phone market gradually migrated to its current 
configuration. Today, there are four mobile phone com-
panies with national coverage and a reasonably balanced 
market: Vivo (Telefónica), TIM (Telecom Italia), Claro 
(América Movil) and Oi (Portugal Telecom and Brazilian 
partners). Moreover, there is a fifth company specialized 
in mobile services (SME or trunking), which also operates 
throughout Brazil (Nextel, of the Nextel NII group). 
Between 2003 and 2014, the number of households 
with a telephone went from just over 30 million to ap-
proximately 63 million (Figure 1). This trend is even more 
striking when measured as a proportion of total house-
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holds: 61% in 2003 and 93% in 2014. Moreover, much of 
this progress can be attributed to an increase in the pene-
tration of cell phone service. In most Brazilian households, 
the cell phone is the only means of access to telephone 
service services. This trend is more pronounced among 
low-income households. The massification of telecommu-
nications in Brazil is largely a result of the expansion of 
mobile services, especially in the pre-paid mode.
The comparison of the spread of mobile telephone ser-
vice in Brazil with other groups of countries only confirms 
these results. In recent years, the penetration of mobile 
phones in Brazil neared the average of the rich countries 
much faster than the average of the other middle-income 
countries. 
However, there is one thing that can counteract the 
diagnosis of success of the spread of mobile telephone ser-
vice in Brazil. On one hand, there was a significant in-
crease in access. On the other, although it has increased in 
recent years, the use of the mobile services is still relatively 
low in Brazil, even after adjusting for differences in income 
between the countries.
This is probably related to the pricing of mobile ser-
vices: in many international comparisons, with different 
methodologies, Brazil always appears among the countries 
where mobile services are more expensive (see, for example, 
BARRANTES & GALPERIN, 2008). By way of illus-
tration, in 2012 the average rate (in dollars adjusted for 
purchasing power parity) for calls made from prepaid cell 
phones in Brazil was the 140th highest in the world (out 
of 144 countries) (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM & 
INSEAD, 2014). In 2011 the cost of a typical basket of 
mobile services in Brazil (also measured in dollars adjusted 
for purchasing power parity) was the 157th in the world 
(out of 161 countries) (ITU, 2012). From this point of 
view, the success of mobile telephone service in Brazil 
should at least be subject to qualification.
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In summary, the limited use of mobile services by 
Brazilians apparently is not explained by elements of de-
mand, but rather by supply: typically, its prices are higher 
in Brazil than in the rest of the world. This being the case, 
what are the causes of such high prices?
Competition
The most obvious explanation would be the absence of 
competition. However, Brazil has five major companies 
providing mobile services on a national scale and the ob-
servation of the indices of industry concentration indicates 
that apparently there is competition in Brazil. But, despite 
the low concentration of the market, companies - tacitly 
or explicitly - could be acting in a coordinated manner 
to raise prices. Again, this does not seem to be the case. 
The profitability of Brazilian companies in the sector is 
among the lowest in the world, making this explanation 
implausible. 
Tax Burden
Thus, all that remains to investigate are the costs incur-
red in the provision of mobile services in Brazil. Are they 
higher than in other countries? In this regard, the first 
thing that comes to attention is the tax burden on tele-
communications services. Typically, tax burden is around 
43% on telecommunication services in Brazil, one of the 
highest in the world (DELOITTE & GSMA, 2011). 
There is considerable debate in the United States on 
the need and gains involving the reduction of taxation on 
these services (see, for example, HAUSMAN, 2000). If 
this debate is relevant in the American context - where 
income is higher and the tax burden (around 17%) is si-
gnificantly lower compared with Brazil - surely it is also 
important in the Brazilian context.
It is possible to calculate the impact of reducing the tax 
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indicate the proportion 
relative to total households. 
Only permanent households 
were considered.
Source: Brazilian National 
Household Sample Survey.
Figure 1: Evolution of Telephone Service Access in Brazilian Households
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burden on mobile services in Brazil to the prevailing ave-
rage level in the United States. The producer surplus would 
increase by R$ 2.9 billion a year, the consumer surplus to 
R$ 10.6 billion and the collection of taxes would decrease 
by R$ 8.8 billion. In net terms, that is, discounting the 
purely distributive effects, in which the gain of one agent 
is simply a loss for another, it represents an increase of R$ 
4.7 billion per year. It should be emphasized that these 
estimates refer only to mobile voice services and do not 
include data services such as mobile broadband. 
It is clear that reducing taxes on mobile services would 
generate not insignificant gains in welfare. However, in the 
Brazilian case it is a difficult policy to put into practice. 
For many states, the revenues from these taxes account for 
much of the overall tax revenue; and even for the federal 
government there is currently little room for the reduction 
of tax burdens. 
Remuneration for Networks 
Another possible explanation for the high price of mobile 
services could be the remuneration model of the mobile 
carriers’ networks. Whenever a (mobile or fixed-line) call 
is made, the company originating the call must pay the 
receiving company for the use of its network. In Brazil, 
although it has come down in recent years, the amount of 
such remuneration for mobile networks (called VU-M in 
Brazil) is still high by international standards. 
Indeed, in principle it would be expected that the 
incentives are such that companies would negotiate an 
amount close to the marginal cost of the termination of 
the call, at least in the case where the traffic between com-
panies is reasonably balanced (payments would cancel 
each other out). But this is not what happens in practice, 
not only in Brazil, but in most countries. In this instance, 
we need to separate two distinct cases.
The first refers to calls that originate from fixed-line 
telephones and terminate with mobile phones (F2M). In 
this case, the mobile phone companies have the capacity 
and the incentive to charge values higher than the mar-
ginal cost of call termination. Intuitively, by charging 
amounts above cost, the mobile phone companies could 
use the profits to reduce the charges to subscribers and 
attract more consumers, especially if the competition is 
vigorous, as seems to be the case in Brazil. That is, com-
petition acts in the direction of increasing the termination 
rate, not reducing it. In this case, the literature predicts 
that a reduction in the termination rate of the mobile 
networks results in: (i) lower prices for users of fixed-line 
services; (ii) a reduction in the profitability of mobile car-
riers; (iii) a reduction of the diffusion of mobile phones 
(GENAKOS & VALLETTI, 2012).
dossier
Item (iii) is known as the waterbed effect. Since there 
are positive network externalities, mobile companies have 
incentives to compete aggressively for new customers by 
reducing subscriptions. The revenue loss with this strategy 
is compensated by higher incoming call traffic. Thus, the 
higher the termination rate, the more aggressive can be the 
strategy. Therefore, although the reduction in the termina-
tion rate tends to reduce the price paid per minute for calls 
(mobile and fixed-line), it generates an offsetting increase 
in the value of the subscription and, thus, a decrease in 
the penetration of the mobile services (BAIGORRI & 
MALDONADO, 2014). 
The second case deals with calls between mobile 
phones of distinct companies (M2M). In this situation 
there is a tendency towards a better balance between traf-
fic that enters and leaves each network. Precisely because 
of this interdependence, termination rates can be used as 
an instrument of tacit collusion. In this case, under cer-
tain conditions (limited externalities and preponderance 
of competition in linear prices), a reduction in termina-
tion rates can generate lower prices for mobile calls wit-
hout significant effects on the diffusion of that service 
(GENAKOS & VALLETTI, 2012).
If mobile services are relatively less important than 
fixed-line services, the trend is that the dominant effect 
is that of fixed-to-mobile calls. This probably was the case 
when much of the regulatory framework of the sector was 
initially defined. In practice, because the regulators com-
monly require that termination rates are the same for calls 
originating from fixed-line or mobile networks, what is 
observed is that they are concerned about very high rates, 
and not very low rates. Not coincidentally, various regula-
tors, especially in Europe, have moved to regulate them, 
usually by setting values that are close to some measure-
ment of costs.
In Brazil, there has always been concern about redu-
cing the mobile termination rates. The main argument is 
that they help subsidize the pre-paid mobile phones. In 
short, it is feared that the reduction in mobile termina-
tion rates could trigger the waterbed effect and reduce 
the spread of these services, especially among the low-in-
come consumers who are more sensitive to increases in 
the price of the subscription rate. Some authors reported 
that, in the Brazilian case, this possibility actually exists 
(see BAIGORRI & MALDONADO, 2014, for example). 
However, these are studies that use older data, in periods 
when mobile telephone service had lower relative impor-
tance (and, therefore, the waterbed effect had greater 
relevance).
The empirical literature with international data also 
follows this pattern. In earlier periods, the waterbed 
Net I i  Quarterly | vol. 18 | o 1  | 2016 1
Network Industries newsletter  | vol. 13 | n°3 | 2014        19 
effect is shown to be quite relevant. However, in the re-
cent literature this effect usually tends to disappear (see 
KONGAUT & BOHLIN, 2014 for references). Because 
of this, after small initial reductions, ANATEL recently 
decided to reduce the maximum reference value for the 
mobile termination rates more consistently. By 2019, this 
amount should fall to something close to the incremental 
long-term cost. If the empirical literature is correct, and if 
one observes what happened in other countries that have 
adopted this strategy, a reduction in the price of mobile 
services is expected without a significant impact on its dis-
semination (or on the profitability of the companies).
Final Considerations
The importance of communications infrastructure in the 
development of countries and increasing productivity is 
widely documented. And, in this regard Brazil’s relative 
backwardness in communications compared with other 
sectors, is smaller. This partly reflects the success of the 
sector’s regulatory model, especially the positive results in 
terms of introducing competition (especially in mobile 
services). Obviously, this should not be taken to mean 
there is no room for improvement. 
There are major opportunities to progress with respect 
to taxation of services and equipment. In the case of ser-
vices, Brazil’s tax regime is one of the highest in the world. 
For equipment, although there are public policies for tax 
reductions, the protection the industry enjoys in the do-
mestic market ends up making their prices very expensive 
compared to other countries.
In the case of network remuneration, Brazil chose to 
follow the experience of other countries and reduced the 
termination rates for mobile services. It is expected that in 
the coming years the price of services will be reduced. 
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Managemnet of Urban Infrastructures
A Massive Open Online Course by EPFL - MIR - IGLUS
In recent years, online courses have emerged as a game changer in the educational landscape. Massive Open 
Online Courses (MOOCs), covering a wide variety of subject matters, are now available to practitioners, as 
well as academics, and continue to attract increasingly large audiences via online education platforms such 
as Coursera and EdX. These online courses enable learners to choose from a diverse array of subjects and to 
freely explore those that are most interesting to them at their own pace. The combination of the flexibility 
associated with online education and the high quality of courses offered by world-class universities, have 
turned MOOCs into an appealing learning reference for many. As a result, these courses have become par-
ticularly invaluable to those practitioners who have limited time and tight schedules restricting them from 
attending conventional training programs, but still feel the need to stay up to date with the cutting edge 
knowledge in their fields. 
As of February 2016, the Chair Management of Network Industries (MIR), is offering a free online course on 
the Management of Urban Infrastructures as one of the products of a global action research initiative relating 
to the Innovative Governance of Large Urban Systems, called IGLUS. This free, and on-demand, course covers 
the basic principles of the management of urban Infrastructures and illustrates these principles through a 
deeper investigation of two of the most important urban infrastructures- the urban energy and transporta-
tion sectors. 
In this online course we, at EPFL, have worked with a series of our partners in the IGLUS project, namely the 
World Bank, The Veolia Environment group, Swiss Post, City-Canton of Geneva, Boston Consulting Group, and 
City University of New York. By providing a combination of inputs from both academia and industry experts, 
we have tried to give a balanced overview of the basic principles of urban infrastructure management and to 
also illustrate how practitioners make use of these principles in the real-world. 
In less than 2 months, about 4000 learners had enrolled in the course and the feedback from this large 
audience is quite promising (Click here to see the feedback). The online learning forum associated with this 
course provides us with a unique opportunity to host discussions and hear a range of diverse perspectives 
on the managerial issues raised in the course. People attending the course represent more than 90 different 
nationalities, and the debates centered around the course materials reflect this diversity and are in them-
selves an immense learning opportunity, both for us and our learners. You can find more information about 
free registration in this course by visiting the IGLUS webpage at: http://iglus.org/mooc
We are currently planning the second part of the course that is set to go online Spring 2017. The second 
part of the course will have a more keen focus on the Management of Urban Infrastructures in presence of 
disruptive innovations introduced by the ICT sector; which can be labeled as Management of Smart Urban 
Infrastructures. 
Online courses that cover managerial, regulatory and governance issues in different network industries are 
becoming increasingly more prevalent. So, as of this issue of NIQ we will introduce a new section that closely 
follows the world of online education and reviews the currently available, and the upcoming, MOOCs that 
might be useful for academics and practitioners active in the field of Network Industries. 
If you would like to write a review about a MOOC and publish it in an upcoming issue of NIQ, please send an 
email to mohamad.razaghi@epfl.ch.
Review of Online courses related to Network Industries
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announcements
The Transport Area of the Florence School of Regulation
The Florence School of Regulation (FSR) has been created in 2004 as a partnership between the European 
University Institute (EUI) and the Council of the European Energy Regulators (CEER). Since then, the Florence 
School of Regulation has expanded from Energy regulation to Telecommunications and Media (2009), Trans-
port (2010) and Water (2014).
The Transport Area of the Florence School of Regulation (FSR Transport) is concerned with the regulation of 
all the transport modes and transport markets (including the relationship among them). It currently focuses 
on regulation and regulatory policies in railways, air transport, urban public transport, intermodal transport, 
as well as postal and delivery services.
The aim of FSR Transport is:
• to freely discuss topics of concern to regulated firms, regulators and the European Commission by way of 
stakeholder workshops;
• to involve all the relevant stakeholders in such discussions; and
• to actively contribute to the evolution of European regulatory policy by way of research.
The core activity of FSR Transport is the organization of policy events, where representatives of the European 
Commission, regulatory authorities, operators, other stakeholders, as well as academics in the field meet to 
shape regulatory policy in matters of European transport.
The results of FSR Transport’s activities are disseminated by way of policy briefs, working papers and acade-
mic publications. All FSR Transport materials are open source and available on the FSR Transport webpage, as 
they aim to involve professors, young academics and practitioners to become part of a unique open platform 
for applied research. 
To learn more visit our website: www.florence-school.eu or contact us at FSR.Transport@eui.eu.
Highlight
Date Title
29 February 2016 4th Florence Intermodal Forum
9 March 2016 Executive Seminar at the World ATM Congress in Madrid
 2 May 2016 12th Florence Rail Forum
24 June 2016 5th Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures
For more information about our activities please contact: FSR.Transport@eui.eu.
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The European Transport Regulation Observer series enters the EU Bookshop
The Observer is published approximately four weeks after each Transport Forum and 
reflects upon the discussed topics. It features a summary of the discussions at the Forum 
focusing on the most important arguments in the debate thanks to comments of Prof 
Matthias Finger and other specialized academics.
The Observer carries an ISSN number and, from now you can find is also in the EU Books-
hop. 
FSR-Transport events Spring 2016: 
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5th Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures
The final programme of the 5th Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures is now available: 10 papers 
have been selected by the Scientific Committee, and the authors of those papers will come to Florence to 
present and discuss them at the FSR annual conference. 
Join the discussion! Please contact Ms Nadia Bert at FSR.Transport@eui.eu 
Conference Topic
The de- and re-regulation of the different network industries is an ongoing process at national and global 
levels. As this process unfolds, ever new phenomena emerge. Yet, the question about the right mixture 
between market, economic, technical and social regulation remains wide open in all the network industries. 
The question becomes even more challenging when looking at recent infrastructure development as triggered 
by their pervasive digitalization. Not only are the different infrastructures transformed by their digitalization – 
e.g., digital transport, smart energy, etc. – calling for new approaches to regulating them, but moreover does 
digitalization become a phenomenon in its own right. The European Commission actually sees digitalization 
as a means to accelerate integration, to tear down regulatory walls and to move from 28 national markets to 
a single one. Consequently, digitalization and especially its implications in terms of privacy and security also 
require regulatory attention.
This 5th Florence Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures aims at taking stock of the major challenges 
infrastructure regulation is currently facing in the age of their rapid digitalization. 
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Network Industries Quarterly, Vol. 18, issue 2, 2016 (June) “Financing of infrastructures in 
Latin America” 
Evidence exists that investment in infrastructure contributes to growth, by increasing productivity, reducing 
production costs, and facilitating the accumulation of human capital. However, despite the evidence of the 
positive impact of infrastructure on growth, according to the World Bank, the Gross capital formation (% of 
DGP) in Latin American Countries (LAC´s) was 21.4% in 2014, while in fast-growing economies, such as China 
and India, it was 46.2 and 31.6%, respectively. Besides, according to the Interamerican Development Bank, 
the total investment in infrastructure in LAC´s has been fallen since the late 1980s.
As a result of the gradual decline in investment, LAC´s have been implementing structural reforms aimed at 
increasing productivity, in some cases through investment in infrastructure. However, unfavorable internatio-
nal economic conditions have made this process to be difficult. Some examples of these conditions are the 
decrease in the price of commodities, the strengthening of the U.S. dollar, and the decrease in the flow of 
capital in the region, causing a negative impact on capital allocation to infrastructure in LAC´s.
One other reason for low investment in infrastructure in LAC’s is that it has traditionally been financed with 
public debt, through bank lenders. In this context, public investment alone has proved to be insufficient in 
increasing the stock and quality of infrastructure to acceptable levels. As a consequence, in LAC´s, it is essen-
tial to increase private participation through money and capital markets to finance infrastructure.  
Despite the above, the LAC´s capital markets are not sufficiently developed, compared to advanced econo-
mies. Also in LAC´s, there are some obstacles in the financial markets, some of which are high transactions 
costs, political and governance risks, and policy and regulatory barriers. Consequently, in order to increase 
private participation in investment in infrastructure in LAC´s, through money and capital markets, it is neces-
sary to create the institutional and market conditions. In order to do so, the LAC´s need a stronger regulatory 
framework, where institutional investors, such as pension and mutual funds, could increase their capital 
allocations in infrastructure, for example through schemes such as Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), without 
increase their risks exposition.
The goal of this special issue is to measure the effects, causes and consequences of inadequate levels of 
infrastructure investment in LAC´s. It is also to help in understanding the restrictions that money and capital 
markets in LAC´s are facing as they strive to increase their participation in the process of infrastructure finan-
cing. Also, the objective of this special issue is to help to identify the conditions for the capital and money 
markets to increase their participation in the infrastructure financing process.
The topics for the special issue can include, but are not limited to, the following:
• Effects of regulation, or lack of regulation, in LAC financial markets on infrastructure investment
• How the different sources of financing infrastructure affect LAC economic growth 
• Effects of securitization on infrastructure investment
• The role of institutional investors, such as pension and mutual funds on financing infrastructure
• The influence of high transactions costs, political and governance risks, and policy and regulatory barriers 
on infrastructure financing
• The conditions for the proper implementation of Public Private Partnerships PPP´s 
• New source of financing infrastructure in LAC, given regulatory and other restrictions
• The role of collaterals or guarantees in promoting financing infrastructure
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Submission Guidelines
If you are interested in contributing, please send an email to the editors of this special issue on “Financing of 
infrastructures in Latin America”, Dr. Arturo Bernal Ponce (larturo.bernal@itesm.mx), with a cc to Nadia Bert 
at FSR.Transport@eui.eu. 
Formatting 
• Title: Straightforward — without a subtitle (maximum 12 words) 
• Author: First and last name 
• Abstract: Two sentences that summarize the content of the article (30 words +/- 5) 
• Body: Content of the article (minimum 1 250 words; maximum 2 500 words) 
• Tables: Maximum of two tables or figures (subtract 250 words per item in the maximum word count) 
• References List of references cited in the body (10 references +/- 2) 
Important Dates
• Full paper: 1 May 2016.
• Publication of the issue: 21 Jun 2016.
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Call for Papers
Special issue on: Network Industries in Latin America
Guest Editors
Joisa Campanher Dutra, Getulio Vargas Foundation, Rio de Janeiro
Matthias Finger, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale Lausanne and European University Institute, Florence
Miguel Angel Montoya Bayardo, Tecnologico de Monterrey, Guadalajara
Abstract
The network industries in Latin America (from Mexico to Chile) are undergoing substantial changes, marked in particular 
by their liberalization but also their privatization. Similarly, the regulation of the network industries’ sectors is gradually 
being institutionalized following European, American, but also endogenous approaches. Overall, however, the de- and 
re-regulation of the network industries in Latin America follows no clear model and results are mixed, at best.
This special issue of Utilities Policy aims at shedding light at the de- and the re-regulation practices in the different 
network industries and in the different Latin American countries, notably Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Argentina, 
Chile and others. This special issue is especially dedicated to critically analyzing these practices, along with the policies 
that have inspired them.
Topics Covered
• Description and critical assessment of the different network industries’ de- and re-regulation policies and practices 
in Latin America, notably Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Argentina and Chile
• Sectors covered: telecommunications, postal services, electricity, gas, air transport, rail transport, road transport, 
urban public transport, water and wastewater
• Comparative studies across sectors and countries are particularly welcome
Notes for Prospective Authors
All papers must be submitted through the Utilities Policy website:  http://ees.elsevier.com/juip/. Make sure to upload 
your paper to the special Issue “Latin America”.
Submitted papers can be in early draft versions, but should not have been previously published nor be currently under 
consideration for publication elsewhere. All papers will be selected through a peer-review process. For more informa-
tion, please see the Author Guidelines page.  The authors of the selected papers will be invited to either a conference in 
Guadalajara, Mexico, on November 21st, 2016 or a conference in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on November 23rd, 2016, during 
which their papers will be presented and critically discussed before a final submission to the special issue.
Important Dates
Draft paper due on 30 September, 2016
Notification of acceptance to the Conference on 15 October, 2016
Conference in Guadalajara, Mexico, on 21 November, 2016 or in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on 23 November 2016
Submission of revised paper on 31 January, 2017
Notification of acceptance on 15 April, 2017
Publication date: August to September 2017
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